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ABSTRACT
A novel method for gamma-ray imaging of isotope separations is tested
and validated. Current methods of validating separation processes involve taking
samples or gamma-ray counting before and after a process has occurred. The
method presented offers individuals or agencies the ability to verify that a
process has occurred by watching the process instead of the precursors and
products of the process.
The goal of this method is to establish a means to evaluate the adherence
to an approved isotope separation process quickly and safely with minimal
interpretation needed by the user.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1

The Need for Stand-Off Detection of Radiological
Materials

Accounting for radiological material has been a challenge for governments and
agencies since the discovery of these useful isotopes. Useful isotopes in the
pre-war era would have included industrially useful compounds including radium,
however the greater multitude of isotopes available following the introduction of
nuclear reactors have increased the complexity of the accountability task. While
there are legitimate uses for these materials, there are countless nefarious uses
for the same material, which can have devastating effects when used in even
small quantities. While gram quantities are not necessarily themselves a direct
threat to national security, the damaging social consequences of even a small
mass of material cannot be overlooked.
To counter this threat, countless detection systems have become commonplace
in facilities that handle radioactive material. Detection systems in these facilities
range from simple hand-held devices to whole body counting systems.
Furthermore, not only are the detection systems broad in scope, but their
application is just as diverse. From hospitals to national laboratories across the
world stand-off detection is used to ensure more unauthorized movement of
radiological material.
The purpose of these systems is two-fold. Not only do they provide safeguards
for public health and safety but perhaps more importantly, they help prevent
unauthorized materials from leaving the facility.

1.2

The Need for Monitoring the Diversion Pathways of
Special Nuclear Material

Diversion of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) can be accomplished in number of
ways. SNM is available for diversion before and after it enters a reactor,
however if a reactor is available a greater number of diversion pathways open to
a malicious actor.
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Diversion of Enriched Uranium
The effort required to enrich Uranium limits those who are able to accomplish this
task. However, once the process of enriching the material to a low level is
perfected, the difficulty of continuing enrichment to higher levels becomes much
easier.
Piping in these enrichment facilities can be rearranged or changed in order to
make a peaceful facility into a clandestine operation. Various technological
advances in facility mapping have helped ensure no unauthorized changes have
been made to the original operational intent of the enrichment process.
Inspection groups can use that same facility mapping process to verify the
existence of diversion pathways that have been created within the architecture of
the building.
Diversion of Transuranic Elements and Post-Irradiation Uranium
Generally, if a country has established a means of creating used nuclear fuel,
their scientific prowess is sufficient to enable them to reprocess this fuel. Such a
situation would allow them to extract the SNM within. Given the potential
dangers that transuranic elements and the remaining uranium-235 (235U) pose to
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, any covert operation involving the use
of these isotopes is unacceptable to the international community.
Traditional methods of verifying the separation of industrially or commercially
useful isotopes from the isotopes that present a proliferation concern would
require either alpha particle or gamma-ray analysis. The challenge surrounding
these analytic methods is that they require a stop of operations while the
samples are analyzed prior to continuing the separation. Furthermore, these
methods are not necessarily field deployable without significant resources.
Given the verification requirements and challenges presented by the current
verification methods, a verification method which allows for an in-situ validation of
separations would be an invaluable tool for the safeguards community. Not only
would such a tool allow for greater deployability of verification teams, but also
allow for more such teams to be fielded since a smaller logistical footprint is
necessary for each unit.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

The ability to use the principle of Compton scattering has been theorized and
applied within the past half-century. In the past decade this Compton technology
has been transformed from bulky, Dewar cooled high purity germanium crystals,
to mechanically cooled, briefcase sized units capable of both detecting and
subsequently localizing samples of gamma-ray emitting radioisotopes.

2.1

Using standoff gamma-ray detection to localize
radioisotopes

While gamma-ray spectroscopy alone can be burdened by background radiation,
gamma-ray imaging technology is potentially less sensitive to the same
background noise [1].
Facility Verification and Isotope Localization
The use of facility mapping in recent years has been well documented and offers
a great deal of progress in ensuring that facilities are used as intended. Some of
the earlier work in contemporary facility verification dealt with simply ensuring
that an “as approved” design matched the “as built” facility. Applications of this
methodology were used on interior rooms, exterior facades, and aerial compound
mapping [2]. Older methods might have involved comparing photographs of the
facility over time, however modern methods allow for the use of laser range
scanners with millimeters of resolution. These mapping systems can be tripod,
motor vehicle, or aircraft mounted and offer excellent resolution using the laser
range finding technology.
More modern methods of facility verification combine the use of laser mapping
technology with radiation imaging. The integration of a laser scanned image with
a gamma-ray image projection allows for much more detailed analysis of facility
construction [3]. Such a methodology enhances the ability of safeguard teams to
ensure that facility modifications are not clandestine in nature.
More recent work building from the previous example enhances the static
imagery with a moving photographic imaging and gamma-ray detection system.
This allows for a greater volumetric survey of the space and can produce near
real-time imaging of the isotopes in the environment [4]. Use of “Commercial Off
the Shelf” (COTS) technology has also made combining these technologies
3

when the appropriate integration software is applied. The use of commercially
available High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors integrated with the
Microsoft® X-Box® Kinect™ sensor is one such example of this COTS
application.
Process Verification and Isotope Path Confirmation
Given the macroscopic application of the integrated photographic or laser image
with the gamma-ray image described in the facility verification section above, a
follow-on step would practical application of that technology would be the ability
to verify processes with isotopic precision. Furthermore, the capacity for
integrated software and hardware to produce more real-time readouts will make
process verification practical for safeguards personnel. Such process verification
would disable another proliferation pathway and potentially refuse an adversary
the ability to divert Special Nuclear Material (SNM).
Aqueous reprocessing of used nuclear fuel is a standard method by which
commercially and industrially useful isotopes are extracted for use by private
enterprise or for use as new fuel for reactors. Because of the proliferation
concern surrounding the disposition of specific isotopes, many safeguards have
been enacted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the
Rokkashomura Reprocessing Plant (RRP) many such safeguards were designed
into the facility design, however shortcomings still exist. The United States
Department of Energy (USDOE) called for “innovative approaches in process
monitoring and other safeguards” and suggested that using the facilities own
instruments to monitor processes would violate the IAEAs policy on joint-use
equipment [5].
To maintain accountancy of nuclear material within on significant quantity of
plutonium (8kg), and to avoid the “joint-use” of equipment, the IAEA has been
using destructive assay techniques at significant financial cost and time
expenditure. To address these concerns, the use of online gamma-ray
spectroscopy has been simulated to provide a near real-time accountancy of
process streams. However, these streams were limited to reporting normal and
off-normal conditions [6]. These same simulations were later used as the basis
for several process experiments and while they did demonstrate the ability to
distinguish normal and off-normal spectra, they still did not integrate any spatial
isotope visualization into their experiments [7].
The most recent demonstration of an online process verification technique again
involved gamma-ray measurements however compared results from before and
after a process had occurred. Such a scenario would allow a user to verify input
and output similarity and compare gross gamma-ray counts and peak ratios for
isotopic analysis. Moreover, simple counting procedures like this one are cost
effective and do not require significant logistical support for continuous operation
4

[8]. The drawbacks of such a system would include a lack of standoff from the
actual facility architecture and no ability to watch the actual process itself.

Figure 2.1: Gamma-Ray Detection Before and After Separation Process [8]
Based on the literature research, there is an apparent gap in the current state of
process monitoring for safeguards purposes. Currently, methodology is only to
evaluate a process before and after the actual process occurs. This can be
accomplished either with destructive analysis in the post-process or online nondestructive analysis. However, what could offer greater certainty in safeguards
would be a visualization of the actual process itself. Furthermore, if this process
could be accomplished with an increased degree of standoff, less interaction with
the facility architecture would be required by inspection groups.
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CHAPTER THREE
MATERIALS AND METHODS

3.1

Equipment

The isotopes that we used in our experiments were both naturally occurring and
synthetic. In general, the synthetic isotopes were substantially more active than
their natural counterparts. The synthetic isotopes that were used originated at
the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL). The experiments were then conducted at the Radiochemical
Engineering and Development Center (REDC) with the products of our
separations used in applications across the United States in both science,
medicine, and space exploration. While some of the experiments we observed
are a weekly occurrence at the REDC, others were decades in the making. The
einsteinium experiments we conducted were a decade in the making, and the
separation was the first conducted using such a capable detection system as the
one listed below.
While our experiments involved dozens of isotopes, we were able to execute
each of the trials without changing much of our equipment. The most crucial
device in each of our experiments was the gamma-ray detection device.
Ensuring this device remained constant throughout the trials reduced uncertainty
as we varied the parameters of the environment it was detecting.
Gamma-Ray Detector
For each of our four experiments, we used a high purity germanium (HPGe)
detector produced by PHDS Co., of Knoxville, Tennessee. The Germanium
Gamma-ray Imager (GeGI) was the fourth iteration (GeGI v4) of their marketable
series of mechanically cooled HPGe detectors. The GeGI has the unique ability
to both detect the presence of and identify the location of radiological species in
a four-pi environment. These localized isotopes are then overlaid on a
photograph taken directly in front of the detector face. All radiological signatures
not forward of the detector face are visible on a white background rather than a
rearward facing photograph.
The use of an individually portable detection system with such broad abilities
would make such a detector invaluable to material verification teams operating in
potentially restrictive environments. Normally, HPGe (high purity Ge) detection
systems require the use of a Dewar of liquid nitrogen in order to cool the
6

germanium crystal below 80 degrees Kelvin. The advantage of the GeGI, and
other systems using the same mechanical cooling technology, is that no bulky
Dewar is necessary to ensure the sustained operation of the detector crystal.
Contrastingly, while other gamma-ray detection systems, like Sodium Iodide
(NaI), do not require cooling, their energy spectrum resolution cannot easily
compete with that of HPGe systems.
During our experiments, we used two systems that reduced the portability of the
GeGI, however increased the accuracy of our measurements. First, we used a
tripod that allowed for the GeGI to remain stable for the duration of our samples.
Secondly, we used lead collimators, with pinhole apertures between one and five
millimeters, on the detector face of the GeGI (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: The GeGI v4 with Gray and White Lead Collimator and Black Tripod
Glove Box Containment Systems
As our experiments involved isotopes that emitted significant and varied types of
radiation all of our experiments were conducted in a glove box environment. The
glove boxes contained all of the undesirable alpha and beta radiation while still
allowing the experimentally useful gamma-ray radiation to penetrate the glove
box plexiglass and subsequently, the detection system.
While the glove boxes did contain the undesirable alpha and beta radiation, there
were some challenges involved in using these containment systems. Primarily,
there have been dozens of other experiments conducted in the glove boxes that
we used for our experiment. This reality has allowed unwanted background to
collect in the boxes. While we attempted to minimize this with good
7

housekeeping procedures, our experiments will have elevated background
radiation from both glove box contamination and our proximity to other active
experiments in the surrounding glove boxes. The second challenge that glove
boxes presented was the need to position the detector in a manner that enabled
us to collect a photograph and minimally shielded gamma-ray emissions. This
unobstructed placement requirement was also hindered by the need to ensure
that the laboratory technician could safely and effectively perform the operation
that we were witnessing. Figure 3.2 below shows the need to balance the ability
of the detector to see the operation and the ability of the technician to access the
gloves in the left most glove box.

Figure 3.2: Typical Glove Box Setup for Chemical Separation
Columns for Species Separation
While we conducted three separations, only two different column resins were
needed. Both the actinium – radium separation and the americium – neptunium
– plutonium separation used BioRad® MP-1 100-200 mesh. Contrastingly, the
einsteinium – berkelium separation used Dowex® 50W-X8 resin bed.
The physical columns for the experiments also varied based on the isotopes in
question. The actinium – radium separation as well as the einsteinium –
berkelium separation used a narrow diameter glass column. However, the
volume of the material involved in the americium – neptunium – plutonium
separation required the use of a larger diameter glass column. The differences
and similarities regarding the columns may be seen in figure 3.3.
8

Figure 3.3: Setup of three unique experiments
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3.2

Methodology for Species Separation

Column Control Operator
Each of our three experiments was executed by a trained laboratory technician
using a set process algorithm. This individual controlled the pace of the
experiment in order to meet the stated production timeline and goals. While the
detector operator could make requests to move items around the glove box or
wait to move to the next part of the chemical separation, the overall process was
always under the control of the column operator who was conducting the
separation for a specific customer. This level of rigidity was based on which
isotopes were being separated, however because of the time restrictions placed
on the medical isotope separation (actinium – radium), that experiment had little
room for special requests.
Detector Operator
The detector operator was tasked with ensuring that the GeGI was collected data
as designed. This involved saving the data collected at specified intervals to
ensure a time progression could be shown following the completion of the
experiment. The detector operator also was required to note the distance from
the detector face to the column in order to compensate for the camera/detector
parallax.
Radiation Control Technician (RCT)
During the course of our experiments, the team received dose from both neutron
and gamma-ray radiation. Prior to each experiment, approval was required to
execute these separations from the RCT overseers. To mitigate the radiation
dose risks, thermo-luminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and electronic pocket
dosimeters (EPDs) were worn throughout the operation. Radioactive waste was
also created and was disposed of through appropriate channels when cleared by
the appropriate RCT.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EXPERIMENTS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL PROCESSING METHODS

Three of our experiments began with a similar starting point in which a mixture of
radioactive elements was separated into various fractions. These experiments
had the with the goal of isolating an isotope of interest from the remaining
fractions. While these radiochemical separations were of great interest to our
research, the purpose of the separation itself was to isolate one or more isotopes
for sale to a customer.

4.1

Einsteinium – Berkelium Separation Column

In order to test our hypothesis that our gamma-ray detection and visualization
system, the GeGI, was able to witness, in real time, the separation of differing
isotopes, we executed our first experiment using isotopes of significant activity.
A mixture of einsteinium, berkelium, and californium was used to achieve the
significant level of activity. The isotopic mixture was loaded on to the resin and
the GeGI was allowed to collect gamma-ray signatures over the course of
roughly 2.5 hours (9124 seconds). During this collection, the detector was able
to identify the location of the isotopic mixture within the vial (figure 4.1), noting
that the berkelium appeared well distributed within the liquid in the vial.

Figure 4.1: Initial Isotopic Mixture (253Es – 249Bk)
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Following this initial collection, our team attempted a separation of the isotopic
mixture with the goal of collecting a purified sample of 253Es. While purifying the
we were able to note the physical movement of the 249Bk gamma-ray lines
throughout the process (Figure 4.2). While we were unable to verify the
presence of any isotopes remaining in the column, we could track the movement
of those isotopes throughout the glovebox. The process took slightly over one
hour (3976 seconds).

Figure 4.2: Tracking Movement of Isotopic Mixture
Figure 4.3 shows the prominent gamma-ray energies peaks emitted by the
berkelium that allowed for position tracking the isotope as it moved around the
glove box. Of note, during these experiments, the GeGI was able to identify both
the presence and location of the berkelium isotope between 16 and 23 seconds
after activation. This was possible for several reasons including proximity to the
source, the high activity of the isotopes being observed, and finally higher
energies of the gamma-ray emissions. Both einsteinium and berkelium have
short half-lives making them significant sources of gamma-ray energy, however
their SNM counterparts are much longer lived which presents a much lower
activity scenario. Furthermore, the gamma-ray energies emitted by SNM are
significantly lower than was studied in this experiment and will make imaging
those isotopes a greater challenge using Compton imaging techniques.
12

Figure 4.3: Gamma-Ray Spectrum for Es – Bk Experiment
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While we were able to observe the movement of the mixture around a glovebox
using high activity isotopes, we were unable to witness the separation of the
isotopic mixture. This unobserved component of the process was one of the
requirements to demonstrating the GeGI’s ability to verify separation processes
from a standoff distance, without the need for process interruption for classical
alpha decay testing. Challenges faced during this experiment included a novice
level of understanding of the GeGI’s full spectrum of capabilities, a limited
physical window from which to view the execution of the separation, and the
limited reproducibility of this experiment due to a low quantity of einsteinium
available.

4.2

Actinium – Radium Separation Column

One of the challenges that we noticed during our einsteinium – berkelium
experiment was a lack of overall resolution after the separation began. To better
test or detector’s ability to isolate the movement of isotopes within a column we
executed another separation involving small distances. We also began to move
closer to the gamma-ray emissions expected of SNM by using lower activity
sample with less energetic gamma-rays.
This separation would focus on medically useful isotopes and would only
examine the final portion of the diagram in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4: ORNL Ac – Ra Separation Flow Diagram [9]
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In this process, the separation would attempt to purify a sample of actinium-225
(225Ac) for use in the treatment of cancer. In order to accomplish this, the
actinium daughters and other non-necessary isotopes would be removed
allowing for the capture of purified 225Ac to be collected. This particular
experiment was very time sensitive as shipment of the collected actinium was
scheduled for only a few hours after the start of the separation. Given this time
constraint, accurate measurements were a necessity as the separation would not
be available for some time and the process could not be slowed in any significant
way.
In our experiment we were able to witness, from roughly a meter standoff
distance, the detector’s ability to expertly identify isotopes, track the movement of
isotopes, and maintain excellent spatial resolution over the course of our
experiment (Figure 4.5). The entire measurement took roughly one hour (3624
seconds) from our first measurement to our final measurement. The gamma-ray
spectrum emitted by these isotopes is recorded in figure 4.6.

Figure 4.5: Improved Spatial Resolution of Detection
15

Figure 4.6: Gamma-Ray Spectrum for Ac – Ra Experiment
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Furthermore, as verification of the detector’s ability to identify isotopes both in
front of and behind the detector, we moved the sample from the GeGI’s forward
field of view to the device’s rear at a distance of roughly three meters. The GeGI
was able to detect the movement and isolate the location even without a
collimator or photograph available in that direction (Figure 4.7). One can see that
the two gamma-ray peaks identified in the rear-view correlate with francium-221
(Auto:216) and bismuth-213 (Auto:440).

Figure 4.7: Catchment Vessel Transfer to Rear of Detector

4.3

Plutonium – Neptunium – Americium Separation Column

With our final experiment, we had the goal of putting all of the elements of
previous experiments together into one final isotopic separation. The mass of
isotopic mixture used was several hundred times smaller than industrial scale,
however 1.96 grams of Plutonium 239 (239Pu), 5.74 grams of Neptunium 237
(237Np), and 13 milligrams of Americium 241 (241Am) were on hand for this
scaled experiment.
In the event this experiment was also conducted in an effort to date the
Plutonium contained within the mixture, this could be accomplished through an
application of the “Bateman Equations” (Figure 4.8) and known decay chains.

Figure 4.8: Bateman Equation for Isotope Creation and Decay [10]
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The known decay chains of plutonium isotopes are shown in Figure 4.9. The
experimental setup for this separation is shown in figure 4.10 and contains all of
the isotopes identified in the beginning of the section.

Figure 4.9: Plutonium Decay Chains

Figure 4.10: Loaded Column Prior to Separation Attempt
18

This experiment however was not naturally aged plutonium therefore no aging
calculations would be worthwhile in this scenario. Our isotopic mixture was
doped with its americium and neptunium instead of allowing the negligible mass
of plutonium-241 (241Pu) to decay into 241Am and subsequently 237Np.
This separation would attempt to show evidence to determine the plausibility of
using a gamma-ray detection system to provide a means of standoff detection
and process verification in nuclear safeguards. Success for this exercise would
be based on our ability to show that in real time we could witness the extraction
of 241Am from the other isotopes which pose a proliferation concern. Figure 4.11
shows the relative location of all isotopes prior to the separation phase of the
experiment. The gamma-ray spectrum emitted by these isotopes is recorded in
figure 4.12.

Figure 4.11: Isotopes Locations Within the Column Prior to Extraction

Figure 4.12: Gamma-Ray Spectrum Prior to Extracting Isotopes
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As our separation progressed, we noticed the successful extraction of the 241Am
while verifying the 237Np and 239Pu remained in suspension (Figures 4.13 and
4.14). The overwhelming 59.5 keV peak shown in the previous figure is
beneficial in ensuring the successful extraction of the 241Am.
Subsequent alpha particle analysis showed that 99.23% of the 241Am was
extracted without the removal of SNM isotopes. The gamma-ray spectrum
emitted by these isotopes without the 241Am contamination is recorded in figure
4.15.

Figure 4.13: Beginning of Americium Extraction

Figure 4.14: Verification of 241Am Extraction and SNM Suspension
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Figure 4.15: Gamma-Ray Spectrum Following Extraction of 241Am

21

Of note, during these separations, there was ingrowth of protactinium-233
(233Pa). There were both benefits and drawbacks to this ingrowth. The primary
benefit was that the 233Pa could help show where its parent 237Np was radiating
from. However, it did offer a challenge of creating several conflicting gamma-ray
energies that could mask both 237Np and 239Pu since those isotopes are far more
long-lived than 233Pa which a half-life of only 27.4 days. With only gram
quantities of both 237Np and 239Pu, the non-conflicting gamma-ray lines were
hidden within the gamma-ray background. Figure 4.16 shows the spectrum used
to locate the 237Np and 239Pu.

Figure 4.16: Gamma-Ray Spectrum of 237Np (via 233Pa) and 239Pu
The lower energy gamma-ray emissions of the 237Np/233Pa and 239Pu, coupled
with their relative closeness in energy (95.5 keV and 99.0 keV) did challenge the
detector in localization. Figure 4.17 shows the 237Np/233Pa is located towards the
top of the column and the 239Pu is located towards the bottom. Figure 4.18
shows the detector did note the center of concentration of each isotope correctly,
however did require some interpretation of the 237Np/233Pa location because of
the “smear” of 237Np/233Pa counts shown in the 239Pu region of the column.
The anticipated order of extraction on this separation was 241Am, 239Pu, and
237Np/233Pa respectively. After completion of the entire separation, low
background alpha particle spectroscopy and gamma-ray spectroscopy showed
that the 241Am was extracted without notable contamination. Furthermore, the
237Np and 233Pa were extracted together. Contrastingly, while much of the 239Pu
was extracted without contamination from the 237Np and 233Pa, there was an
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Figure 4.17: Column Showing Bands of Color and Isotope Locations

Figure 4.18: SNM Suspension in Separate Column Locations
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equal amount of the 239Pu that remained with the 237Np and 233Pa. This situation
suggests an efficient extraction of the 241Am, and purity of the 239Pu extracted
prior to the 237Np and 233Pa coming off the column.
As described previously, this isotopic mixture was doped with significant amounts
of 237Np which altered the state of secular equilibrium that would most likely exist
in a properly aged plutonium sample. While industrial scale operations would
offer different challenges to measurement, resolving the physical locations of the
237Np and 239Pu could be less challenging when using more non-conflicting
gamma-ray energies.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1

Applications to In-situ Verification of Radiochemistry
Processes

In our limited experiments, we were able to demonstrate the capability to monitor
a process by visually witnessing, in real time, the separation of specific isotopes
from a mixture of SNM. Such a system could enhance security of process
monitoring by providing inspection teams the ability to watch the process and not
simply the before process and after process comparison. Such a novel system
could also allow inspectors with lesser levels of training to observe processes
with greater confidence and less need to collaborate with outside resources.
While the application of this process monitoring method is useful when evaluating
outside entities and governments on the truthfulness of their process outcomes,
this methodology would be equally useful as our own government expands its
production goals with plutonium purification and casting for the first time in
decades. Given the potential loss in personnel experience that would come with
a long absence in industrial scale plutonium production here in the United States,
process verification methods such as this one could prove invaluable as
scientists rediscover these skills or attempt different purification methods.
No matter what the application is however, the user is more result would
available in real-time as the experiment is occurring and would involve much less
data interpretation as currently available methods. Furthermore, visualization of
processes could help refine procedures and reduce waste, as we better
understand the physical processes occurring by pairing our current analysis
methods with the visual data provided with this method.

5.2

Applications to Facility Verification

As discussed earlier in this document, significant progress has been made in
both static and mobile versions of the stand-off gamma-ray facility verification
systems. These roving systems however, appear to have been tested using
sources emitting higher energy gamma-rays or more active gamma-ray sources
which tend to be easier for Compton scattering based imagers to isolate and
localize. Integrating the system tested in our experiments with a facility
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verification scenario involving more than one isotope would help verify that these
systems would be useful in real-world settings.
These facility verification inspections would involve verifying that known facility
plumbing has not been removed and not additional plumbing has been added.
Any added plumbing would typically be tested to ensure it is not diverting any
material from the originally designed intent of the facility. However, by integrating
our imaging technique with the facility mapping techniques developed by others,
a greater level of confidence is obtainable. In fact, verifying that pipes are
carrying the exact isotopes that they are permitted to be carrying would be
possible. This added level of verification would integrate plumbing verifications
with isotope diversion prevention.

5.3

Future Work

While our experiments met with some successes, there were many areas
identified that need greater study. The challenges presented by SNM and other
weakly emitting sources requires greater study. As the SNM we tested tended to
produce gamma-ray energies below 200 keV, and also tended to have greater
half-lives than the other non-SNM isotopes we experimented with, our technique
requires refinement. While industrial scale manufacture of SNM would produce
greater quantities of gamma-rays for collection, the stand-off required would be
greater. An experimenter could potentially overcome this issue through the use
of pinhole zoom techniques (changing focal length of the detector) or by
sacrificing the detector itself to work inside the contaminated area. Either of
these techniques would require more time and funding to determine the feasibility
of either method.
Furthermore, deconvolution of the gamma-ray emissions below 100keV would
prove useful when working with SNM and other sources that emit lower energy
gamma-ray signatures. A deconvolution method might provide a better means to
isolate peaks that are less prominent than are idea to work with. However,
conducting this experiment in an environment of lesser background gamma-ray
emissions would be useful. Conversely, collecting data on the background
gamma-ray spectrum and then subtracting that data from the experimentally
collected spectrum could offer a less elegant, yet equally effective means of
reducing unwanted interference.
Undoubtedly, if more research is conducted into this method more challenges
and opportunities for employment of this technology and technique will present
themselves. While the financial and man-hour cost for this research may be
higher than simply continuing use of our current verification methods, it does
present the opportunity to improve our separation and verification methods,
26

better secure sensitive radiological material, and reduce the time necessary to
identify potential security threats. Each of these benefits warrants additional
attention, however which requirement is most important will allow us to focus our
effort on a specific area of research.
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